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In 1994, John Perry Barlow published The Economy of Ideas in 
WIRED magazine.2   Subtitled “A Framework for patents and copyrights 
in the Digital Age (everything you know about intellectual property is 
wrong),” the article argued that commercializing copyrighted material in 
a digital age was akin to selling wine without bottles.   
 Barlow’s metaphor was startlingly apt.  For more than 200 years, 
U.S. copyright law had defined the rights of both owners and users 
primarily by regulating the creation and distribution of the tangible objects 
in which copyrighted works were embodied.3  Networked digital 
technology enabled the promiscuous copying and broad distribution of 
works completely detached from tangible objects. 
The enigma is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced and 
instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without 
our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can we 
protect it? . . . . 4  
 
1 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivatives 
4.0 International License (CC BY-ND 4.0). 
† John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of 
Michigan.  Jon Weinberg made extremely helpful comments on earlier versions 
of this essay. 
2 John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994), reprinted 
as Selling Wine Without Bottles:  The Economy of Mind on the Global Net, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 (2019).   
3 See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for 
Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 581 (1986); L. Ray Patterson, 
Copyright and the “Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 33 
(1993); R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital 
Networks, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 577, 583–610 (2003). As Barlow noted, the 20th 
century dissemination of works using the broadcast spectrum had also posed a 
wine-without-bottles problem, but most practical uses of broadcasting involved 
the creation of copies. Live television and radio programming received no 
copyright protection at all until the program was embodied in a tangible object. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 101, 102 (2012); Barlow, supra note 2, at 91, 18 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. at 19 (“[B]roadcast transmissions all lack the Constitutional 
requirement of fixation as a ‘writing.’”). 
4 Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 8 (as “[t]he riddle is 
this . . .”). 
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 Barlow’s answer was that we needed to reexamine our 
assumptions about the value and nature of the information that copyright 
law seeks to secure.  Once that authorship was detached from its 
containers, it would no longer work to assume that container-centric 
regulation would treat it appropriately.   
 Some of Barlow’s initial musings on the nature and value of 
information seem startlingly prescient 25 years later.  His prediction that, 
in the near future, “information will be generated collaboratively by the 
cyber-tribal hunter-gatherers of Cyberspace,”5 was an eerily accurate 
description of Twitter.  Barlow’s suggestion that information itself was 
supplanting money as our dominant currency6 presaged a future ruled by 
Google, Facebook, and Amazon, three companies that derive much of their 
monetary value from trafficking in information.  He proposed that we 
reconceptualize information in the networked digital environment as more 
akin to a living organism than a static package of knowledge.  As a non-
carbon-based life form, Barlow suggested, information evolves, spreads, 
and, over time, it spoils.  It creates relationships and meaning. Some 
information’s value depends on exclusivity; other information is worth 
more the more common it becomes.7  
 Legacy owners of intellectual property, he complained, were 
engaging in futile efforts to buttress the old, container-centric rules to 
enable them to stretch around the new reality.  He predicted that the 
disconnect between traditional copyright law and digital technology would 
prove to be unbridgeable: 
Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or 
expanded to contain digitized expression any more than real estate 
law might be revised to cover the allocation of broadcasting spectrum 
(which, in fact, rather resembles what is being attempted here).  We 
will need to develop an entirely new set of methods as befits this 
entirely new set of circumstances.8 
 Twenty-five years later, though, it appears that Barlow might have 
underestimated the tenacity of legacy copyright owners.  Despite 
significant missteps, bad bets, and massive investment in stupid initiatives, 
they seem to have emerged into a new world where, from their vantage 
 
5 Barlow, supra note 2, at 90, 18 DUKE L. & TEC. REV. at 19. 
6 See Barlow, supra note 2, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 24 
(“[Information] may become the dominant form of human trade.”). 
7 See Barlow, supra note 2, at 89–90, 126–27, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 19–
21. 
8 Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 9. 
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point, the copyright rules are startlingly similar to the rules that governed 
the old world, only better. 
ii. 
 Initially, copyright owners relied on a combination of two 
strategies.  First, they put their hopes in what Barlow described as “crypto 
bottling.”9  Second, they backed up that plan with hefty helpings of 
relentless litigation.  In the 1990s, many lobbyists for legacy copyright 
businesses insisted that, although consumers might enjoy content created 
by amateurs if it were free, the only good reason for a consumer to pay for 
Internet access would be to enjoy commercially-produced entertainment 
and information products.  It followed that one could make a profit from 
providing Internet access by selling subscriptions to consumers eager for 
that content.  If copyright owners could prevent consumers from gaining 
unlicensed access or making unlicensed copies, they'd be able to charge 
them lots of money for licensed access.  They figured that devising a 
technological system to prevent unauthorized access or use was just 
around the corner, and if hacking technological protection were unlawful, 
that would effectively deter folks from piracy. 
 Copyright lobbyists persuaded Congress to protect copyright on 
the Internet by enacting a law that made it illegal to circumvent copy 
protection technology for any reason.10  Then, they sat back and waited 
impatiently for software engineers to invent technology that could encase 
copyrighted works in impregnable containers of encryption code.  And 
waited.  Meanwhile, they delayed making their works available online.  
While they were waiting, they sued upstart businesses that dared to offer 
music or video over the Internet, or even to help consumers do it 
themselves.11  Book publishers, movie studios and record labels were 
reluctant to launch less-secure offerings, and wary of cannibalizing their 
 
9 See Barlow, supra note 2, at 129, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 28. 
10 See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998). 
11 See, e.g., MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005); UMG Recordings v. 
Shelter Capital Partners, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011); Arista Records, L.L.C. 
v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009); A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);  Warner Bros. Entm’t v. WTV 
Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Cal 2011); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Hummer-
Winblad, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta 
Books L.L.C, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 
2002); UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1831 (W.D. Pa. 
2000). 
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existing bricks-and-mortar business models.12  When they finally made 
their works available over digital networks, they offered pallid and 
overpriced digital services with terrible user interfaces, often constrained 
by extremely buggy and annoying digital rights management technology.13  
So, there was a bunch of pent-up demand and no real competition when a 
few well-capitalized businesses decided it was worth the litigation risk to 
enter the digital market with offerings of their own.  Apple, Amazon, and 
Google soon became providers of online music, books, and video.  They 
were willing to defend expensive lawsuits, and faced very little 
competition.  Soon, all three had become obligatory partners for content 
owners hoping to distribute their works online.  Online platforms figured 
out that they could make more money by selling eyeballs to advertisers 
than they could by selling movies to viewers or music to listeners.  Apple, 
Amazon, and Google then proceeded to become impossibly wealthy.14 
 Copyright owners resent that.  They've coined the term “value 
gap” to describe the injustice of the fact that platforms have too much 
bargaining power and can therefore shape the terms of copyright licenses 
to call for lower royalty payments than copyright owners believe they 
ought to pay.15  It isn't that platforms don't purchase licenses for the 
copyrighted content that appears on their services––they do.  Because of 
their market dominance, though, they have the upper hand in negotiations 
and can insist on paying lower royalties than copyright owners believe 
would be fair.  Given how much money the big online platforms are raking 
in, copyright owners figure they ought to be sharing a bigger piece of it.16 
Of course, we know now that all of the assumptions underlying 
the impenetrable crypto-bottle strategy were misguided.  There was never 
going to be an impregnable crypto-bottle.17  The electronic game industry 
has managed to make good-enough encryption work, but for owners of 
 
12 See, e.g., ANDREW ALBANESE, THE BATTLE OF $9.99 (2013). 
13 See Jessica Litman, Antibiotic Resistance, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 
53–58 (2012). 
14 See id. at 58–66. 
15 See American Assoc. of Independent Music et al., Joint Comments before the 
US Copyright Office in re Section 512 Study, No. 2015-7 (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-0013-89806; Warner 
Music Group, Comments before the US Copyright Office in re Section 512 
Study, No. 2015-7 (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-0013-86022. 
16 See Jessica Litman, What We Don’t See When We See Copyright as Property, 
77 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 536, 537–42 (2018). 
17 See CORY DOCTOROW, INFORMATION DOESN’T WANT TO BE FREE:  LAWS FOR 
THE INTERNET AGE (2014). 
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copyrights in other works, the legal prohibition on hacking copy-
protection technology has been a bust.18  The additional deterrent effect of 
making it illegal to circumvent digital rights management turned out to be 
negligible.  Moreover, the prohibition is so broadly worded that it seems 
to forbid an independent mechanic from fixing any car containing 
software,19 so people tend not to believe that the behavior it prohibits is 
unlawful.  Anyone can find easy-to-follow circumvention instructions in 
respectable newspapers and online magazines; circumvention software is 
ubiquitous.20  Several major media companies have decided not to bother 
with digital rights management protection at all, since it costs them 
something to encode every copy, and that encoding doesn't in fact provide 
meaningful protection. 
 As the crypto-bottle strategy failed, though, copyright owners 
stumbled into a second tactic that has been far more effective.  The key to 
this approach was a breathtakingly expansive reinterpretation of the 
exclusive right to reproduce a work in copies, predicated on a very broad 
definition of “copy.”21  Fans of this new understanding maintain that 
whenever a work appears in the working memory of any computer 
anywhere, an actionable copy has been made, in violation of the statutory 
reproduction right.22  By insisting, again and again, that the word “copy” 
had long been understood in this broader sense, and by behaving as if they 
were right about that, copyright owners were able to persuade some courts 
that the copyright law, if properly interpreted, afforded them extensive 
 
18 See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2010). 
19 See Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of 
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 
54010, 54021-23 (Oct. 26, 2018) (discussing proposed exemption “allowing for 
circumvention of access controls controlling the functioning of motorized land 
vehicles for purposes of diagnosis, repair, or lawful modification of a vehicle”). 
20 See, e.g., Catherine Ellis, The Best Free DVD Copier 2019, TECHRADAR (Feb. 
11, 2019), https://www.techradar.com/best/the-best-free-dvd-copier; Kirk 
McElhearn, How To Rip DVDs and Blu-Ray Discs with Make MKV and 
Handbrake, MACWORLD (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://www.macworld.com/article/3179350/how-to-rip-dvds-and-blu-ray-discs-
with-makemkv-and-handbrake.html; MacTheRipper, GUSTAVUS ADOPHUS 
COLLEGE, https://gustavus.edu/gts/Mac_the_Ripper (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
21 See Jessica Litman, Fetishizing Copies, in RUTH OKEDIJI, COPYRIGHT IN AN 
AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 107 (2017). 
22 See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. 96–112 (2002) (testimony of Emery Simon, Business Software Alliance); 
see generally Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
1067 (2010). 
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rights to control any appearance of their works over digital networks. 
 The new definition requires some mental gymnastics for readers 
who pay attention to statutory language.  The copyright statute has, since 
1976, defined “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a work is fixed.”23  
Congress hasn’t revised that definition, and copyright owners haven’t 
asked Congress to do so.  Being attached to a material object, though, is 
precisely the characteristic that Barlow argued that digital files lack.  The 
modern revisionist interpretation expands the understanding of a “copy” 
beyond the idea of a tangible material object to include temporary and 
ephemeral instantiations.  Essentially, it reads the words “material objects” 
out of the statutory definition.24  
 Over the past 20 years, this expanded meaning of “copy” has 
ceased to be seen as radical.25   That has allowed copyright owners to sell 
their wine in what I would call make-believe bottles.  Like the digital 
instantiations of the works, these imaginary bottles are not tangible.  That 
lack has turned out to carry with it unexpected advantages for rights 
holders.  Because the bottles are made-up creations, copyright owners can 
imbue them with whatever characteristics they fancy.  By encoding 
 
23 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
24 Most defenses of the expanded conception of “copy” focus only on the  
wording of the definition of “fixation,” which imposes the additional 
requirement that the work’s instantiation in a material object must be 
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 
U.S.C. § 101.  See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
104th Cong. (Dec. 12 & 13, 2001) [hereinafter Section 104 Hearing] (statement 
of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). They assume that since computers 
and computer memory chips are themselves material objects, any time 
expression occupies a memory chip for a period of more than transitory 
duration, a copy has been made. Proponents of the view that RAM copies 
infringe copyrights argue that as long as the computer or other machine is on—
and it could be on indefinitely—a copy of the copyrighted work stored there can 
be perceived or reproduced, thereby satisfying the “more than transitory 
duration” standard. By that logic, a broadcast tower is a material object, an 
unrecorded live television broadcast would therefore necessarily result in a 
copy, and Congress’s conclusion that it did not must have been mistaken. See 
Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The NII Intellectual Property Report, 
COMM. ACM, Dec. 1994, at 21, 23 (“[H]olding a mirror up to a book would be 
infringement because the book’s image could be perceived there for more than 
transitory duration.”).  
25 See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT, 
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 12 (2013). 
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restrictions in the terms of an end user license agreement, distributors of 
copyrighted works have succeeded in limiting the uses consumers are 
permitted to make of lawful copies of copyrighted works.26  It has become 
conventional for copyright owners to insist that digital copies are 
“licensed,” not “sold,” even in transactions that are expressly denominated 
as sales.27  Because the terms of the license may permit or forbid any 
encounter with the work that results in a digital copy, the licensor is 
entitled to subject the purchaser’s use to whatever conditions it chooses to 
impose.  In particular, copyright owners have insisted that their make-
believe bottles are not subject to the first sale doctrine, and the purchasers 
of those bottles may not pass them on to new owners.28  That’s a neat trick: 
a digital file may be a copy for the purpose of infringement liability but 
not a copy for the purpose of transferring ownership.  
 Copyright owners have even persuaded some courts that their 
entitlement to denominate transactions as licenses rather than sales also 
permits them to characterize transfers of physical media containing 
copyrighted works as licenses of the material objects that may preclude 
the purchaser from transferring the material object.29 
 
26 The topic of the use of end user license agreements to negate user’s rights 
under copyright law is much too involved and important for this short essay. 
Peggy Radin and Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz have published 
excellent books with masterful discussions of the ramifications. See AARON 
PERZANOWSKI & JASON SHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP (2016); MARGARET 
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE (2012). 
27 See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Even Amazon Can’t Keep Its EULA Story Straight, 
BOING BOING (Jan. 12, 2010), https://boingboing.net/2010/01/12/even-amazon-
cant-kee.html. 
28 See, e.g., First Sale Doctrine, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance
.org/policy/position-papers/first-sale-doctrine/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2019); Amici 
Curiae Brief of Motion Picture Ass’n of America & Recording Industry Ass’n of 
America at 7–9, Capitol Records v. Redigi, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 
16-2321), https://copyrightalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ReDigi-
RIAA-Amicus-Brief.pdf; see generally First Sale Under Title 17: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the H. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong. (June 
2, 2014), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20140602/102290/HHRG-
113-JU03-Transcript-20140602.pdf. 
29 Compare Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2010), with UMG 
Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). In Disney Enterprises v. 
Redbox Automated Retail, Disney claimed that language on the outside of its 
boxed blu-ray disk, DVD, and digital download code combo packs that said 
“codes are not for sale or transfer” and “this product . . . cannot be sold or rented 
individually,” bound purchasers of the combo packs.  Redbox purchased combo 
packs and sold the three components separately. Disney claimed that a consumer 
who purchased a download code from Redbox infringed its copyright when she 
 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 134 
 
 
 Twenty years ago, proponents of the broad reconstruction of 
“copy” argued that the expansive understanding was an essential tool to 
prevent digital piracy, but acknowledged that the law should find some 
way to allow temporary digital copies that were incidental to legitimate 
uses.30   Today, the fact that an otherwise legitimate use requires the 
creation of a unauthorized digital copy is itself enough to make the use 
illegitimate.31 
iii. 
 In 2019, then, make-believe copyright bottles have given 
copyright owners more legal control over uses of their works than they 
enjoyed under the old-fangled bricks-and-mortar law.  That enhanced legal 
control hasn’t necessarily translated into actual control, but the businesses 
that call themselves the “core copyright industries” report that they are 
earning more money than ever,32 so things seem to be working out okay 
for them so far. 
 Was Barlow wrong about the intellectual property crisis?  He 
predicted in 1994 that the extant system of IP law would fall under its own 
weight: 
It’s fairly paradigm warping to look at information through fresh eyes 
––to see how very little it is like pig iron or pork bellies, and to 
 
or he downloaded the movie, and that Redbox should be held liable as a 
contributory infringer. The court initially ruled that the language did not create 
an enforceable contract, both because it didn’t indicate that opening the box 
would constitute assent and because the purported prohibition on transfer of 
BluRay discs and DVDs sought to impose an unenforceable condition in 
contravention of the first sale doctrine in section 109. Indeed, the district court 
concluded that the overreaching terms of the purported license should be 
considered copyright misuse. See Disney Enters. v. Redbox Automated Retail, 
No. CV 17-08655 DDP (AGRx), 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 61903 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 
20, 2018). Disney revised the language to give purchasers clearer notice on the 
outside of the combo pack box and added lengthy terms and conditions to its 
digital download site. The court agreed that Disney could now succeed on its 
claim that Redbox encouraged its customers to infringe Disney’s copyrights by 
using the digital download, and entered a preliminary injunction. See Disney 
Enters. v. Redbox Automated Retail, 336 F. Supp 3d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2018). 
30 See, e.g., Section 104 Hearing, supra note 24 (statement of Mary Beth Peters, 
Register of Copyrights); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE , DMCA SECTION 104 
REP. 106-48 (Aug. 2001). 
31 See Capitol Records v. Redigi, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018). 
32 See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 
2018 REPORT (2018), https://pmcdeadline2.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/
copyright-industry-report-wm.pdf. 
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imagine the tottering travesties of case law we will stack up if we go 
on legally treating it as though it were. 
As I’ve said, I believe these towers of outmoded boilerplate will 
be a smoking heap sometime in the next decade, and we mind miners 
will have no choice but to cast our lot with new systems that work.33 
 That didn’t happen, or, at least, it didn’t happen in that way or in 
that time frame.  Most of what was idiotic and counterproductive about the 
ways that copyright law worked in 1994 is still idiotic and 
counterproductive in 2019.  If the purpose of copyright law is to 
compensate creators for the products of their minds,34 it hasn’t yet come 
close to achieving that goal.35  Oodles of money flood into the copyright 
system.  Most of that money is siphoned off before it reaches creators’ 
pockets, and where and why the money goes where it goes is kept a closely 
guarded secret.36  Creators across a wide swathe of fields complain of a 
shocking lack of transparency.  Proposals to replace the current system 
with “new systems that work” have so far failed to attract enough support 
to make them feasible. 
 Yet Barlow’s musings about the organic and volatile nature of 
information remain compelling; they seem even truer today than they 
seemed 25 years ago.  Remove information from its containers and it 
spills.  Spills spread.  As different individual creators and researchers 
discover closely-held details of how money and rights move through the 
copyright system,37 that knowledge may itself transform the ways that 
copyright owners do business.  Recent statutory amendments include 
 
33 Barlow, supra note 2, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 24. 
34 See Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 8. 
35 I’ve discussed this problem elsewhere.  See Litman, supra note 16, at 539–50; 
Litman, supra note 18, at 8–12.  
36 See, e.g., Peter C. DiCola & David Touve, Licensing in the Shadow of 
Copyright, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 397 (2014); Eriq Gardner, Fox Rocked by 
$179M ‘Bones’ Ruling: Lying, Cheating and “Reprehensible” Studio Fraud, 
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/fox-rocked-by-179-million-bones-ruling-lying-cheating-reprehensible-
studio-fraud-1190346;  Eriq Gardner, ‘Walking Dead’ Producers Say AMC 
Won’t Explain Basis for Denying Hundreds of Millions in Profits, HOLLYWOOD 
REP. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/walking-dead-
producers-say-amc-wont-explain-basis-denying-hundreds-millions-profits-
1192470. 
37 See, e.g., Zoe Keating, Another Year, TUMBLR,  http://zoekeating.tumblr.com/
post/181269142164/another-year (last visited Mar. 9, 2019); Daniel Sanchez, 
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provisions designed to encourage music and sound recording rights 
holders to disclose more data about the works they control;38 secrets 
revealed as a result of publicized legal disputes have shone light on the 
ways that some rights-holders conceal facts about their earnings and 
payment.39  Even if the heavily fortified legacy copyright system fails to 
crumble under its own weight, a flood of newly revealed information may 
enable the rest of us to piece together a truer picture of where and how the 
system is failing, and what interventions might help creators to wrest back 
some control, or at least some money, from the legacy rights holders 
seeking to preserve the old regime.  
  
 
38 See Hatch-Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264 (2018). 
Cynics suggest that the incentives in the new law will not suffice to persuade 
major music publishers and labels to give up their secrets.  
39 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Wark Ent., Inc., Amended 
Final Award, No. 1220052735 (JAMS Feb. 20, 2019) (Liu, Arb.), 
https://pmcdeadline2.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/final-amended-award-
redactions.pdf. 
 
